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Channeling Competition in the Global Securities Market
Stephen J. Choi*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of Enron, WorldCom, and other recent scandals in the United
States, several have called for regulatory reform. In response, Congress enacted
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that, among other things, implements a new
five-member auditor oversight board consisting of a majority of non-accounting
professionals.' Sarbanes-Oxley also restricts the ability of firm managers to
purchase a wide range of delineated consulting services from the same firm
providing the outside audit of the firm's financials.2 Similar calls for reform exist
to separate investment banking and analyst services within the same financial
house.' Soon, managers may no longer have the ability to influence an analyst's
recommendation through the direction of investment banking business to the same
firm. Even prior to the Enron and WorldCom scandals, the SEC and others have
sought to limit the amount of choice available to corporate managers. In 2000, for
example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated Regulation
FD, limiting the ability of corporations to distribute inside information selectively to
outside analysts among others.4
Perhaps the position of those who fear corporate choice is taken with good
reason. Where managers of large publicly held corporations have a choice,
ranging from the decision to pay themselves a high salary to the decision to hire
an auditor for consulting services, managers may abuse this choice leading to a
"race to the bottom."' On the other hand, for those commentators that argue
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall). Special thanks to Un Kyung Park.
Thanks for helpful comments to Andrew Guzman and Frederick Tung.
1. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, P.L. 107-204 §§ 101-09, 116 Stat. 745. The five-member oversight
board tracks an earlier nine-member board proposed by the SEC. See Michael Schroeder, Critics Take Aim at
SEC's Plan for Auditor-Oversight Board, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2002, at A2 (noting that "SEC Chairman
Harvey Pitt has said the agency plans to unilaterally set up such a board by year's end").
2. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 201.
3. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act directs the SEC or the securities exchanges (including the NASD) to adopt
"not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this section, rules reasonably designed to address conflicts
of interest that can arise when securities analysts recommend equity securities .. " Id. § 501.
4. For an analysis of the desirability of Regulation FD, see Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the
Public Capital Markets, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 533 (2002).
5. For a discussion of the race to the bottom hypothesis, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1435, 1455-56
(1992); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705
(1974) (arguing that competition for corporate charters results in a race to the bottom). To the extent managers
do not own all of the outstanding equity, they will have incomplete incentives to maximize the value of equity
and may choose to increase their own net worth at the expense of shareholders. For a discussion of this agency
problem, see ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 6 (1933) (noting that "[t]he separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the
interests of owner and of ultimate manager may ... diverge"). Managerial opportunism may become
particularly problematic where managers may force firms to engage in a "mid-stream" shift. See Jeffrey N.
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corporate choice is good, particularly with respect to the precise corporate and
securities law regime that should apply to a specific company, the recent scandals
in the United States pose a difficult critique.6 How can we advocate for greater
choice in regulatory protection when self-interested managers abuse the limited
choice presently available to them? The same impulses that may lead managers to
corrupt analysts and auditors through the provision of consulting and investment
banking services may also lead managers to opt for progressively weaker investor
protection if given the ability to select the governing corporate and securities
legal regime.
Rather than provide a direct defense of the desirability of regulatory
competition even in the face of Enron and WorldCom, this brief essay takes a
different approach. The essay makes the argument that regulators themselves
may face a number of perverse incentives in how they regulate. Leaving
regulators with monopoly jurisdiction over issuers and investors may simply give
regulators large latitude to expropriate value for themselves at the expense of
investors. Regulators may also suffer from a number of behavioral biases in their
decision-making. One of the biggest benefits of competition lies in constraining
the actions of self-interested regulators laboring under behavioral illusions.
Moreover, those that oppose regulatory competition must contend with the fact
that some degree of competition is already present among global financial centers. The
clean vision espoused by supporters of the race to the bottom school of a monopolistic
(and hopefully benevolent) regulator insulated from the pressures of competition and
thereby able to take into account the interests of investors and third parties while
avoiding pressure from corporate managers simply does not exist. Investors and issuers
can generally obtain the regulatory protection of a particular regime through
transactions within that regime's territory, for instance.7 Significantly, competition
among regulators today may often occur along dimensions other than investor
protection. Regulators, for example, may seek to usurp authority over transactions
Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1574 (1989) (noting that
"mandatory law is a hands-tying mechanism that provides assurance against opportunistic charter amendment").
6. Proponents of choice in the regulatory regime governing a particular corporation found their start in
the area of corporate law. Such proponents argued that choice among state corporate law regimes in the United
States resulted in a "race to the top" toward better regulations from the perspective of investors. For a
discussion of the race to the top argument, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 212-27 (1991); ROBERTA ROMANO, GENIUS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE LAW 2-12 (1993); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 919-20 (1982); Ralph K. Winter, Jr.,
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 258 (1977).
In the context of securities regulation, several commentators have argued for greater regulatory
competition. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International
Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in
Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1; Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998).
7. Indeed, many foreign issuers may seek to cross-list inside the United States specifically to bond the
credibility and value of their offering as a means of obtaining a higher issue price. For a discussion of the
bonding phenomenon, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and
Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance (Working Paper, 2002).
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extraterritorially and prevent home issuers and investors from exiting the home
regime.8 Competition, therefore, may result in greater costs than benefits as regulators
waste resources attempting to expand their own authority and block investors and
issuers from escaping to other jurisdictions.
Even for those who fear a race to the bottom, the present multi-dimensional
aspect of competition may, therefore, pose greater problems than a system under
which regulators compete solely on the basis of supplied investor protection. To the
extent turning back the clock and undoing decades of increasing integration between
world financial centers is impossible, a move toward greater issuer choice may provide
the better solution from the standpoint of investor welfare compared with the status
quo. While commentators have noted that the self-interest of regulators may also
make a move toward more unrestricted levels of competition based on investor
protection difficult, the growing integration of world financial markets reduces the
cost of implementing such a system of issuer choice.9 Moreover, the high costs
associated with the present multi-dimensional level of regulatory competition may
spur greater efforts at allowing choice based solely on investor protection.
II. POLITICAL ECONOMY
Public choice theory provides a well-known critique of the incentives of
regulators. Simply put, financial regulators may not always act in the best interests of
investors.'° Regulators acting rationally out of their own self-interest may attempt to
expand the size of their agency." Greater size leads to higher levels of prestige (and
possibly compensation for regulators). The ever-expanding number and complexity of
SEC rules and regulations provide some evidence for the size hypothesis. Similarly,
regulators may tailor regulations to favor particular industry groups at the expense of
dispersed investors out of a hope of obtaining a job within the industry once they leave
the SEC.
In theory, regulatory competition over types of investor protection may help
alleviate the public choice problems facing regulators. Once in a competitive
environment, issuers will have a strong incentive at the time they raise capital from the
public markets to install credible and effective forms of investor protection.
2
8. For an early discussion of the costs of extraterritorial application of the U.S. securities laws, see Stephen J.
Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. &
BUS. 207 (1996).
9. Frederick Tung, in particular, has advanced the argument that the self-interest of regulators may act as a
barrier to choice of law rules that implement an issuer choice regime. See Frederick Tung, From Monopolists to
Markets?: A Political Economy of Issuer Choice in International Securities Regulation (Working Paper, 2002).
10. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A
Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 926 (1994) (providing a public choice explanation for the
continued existence of the SEC despite its obsolescence).
11. See W. A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 38 (197 1).
12. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305-07 (1976) (noting that corporations have strong
incentives to choose corporate law rules that maximize shareholder welfare at the time they initially go public).
2002 / Channeling Competition in the Global Securities Market
Issuers that fail to do so may be forced to accept a larger discount from investors.
Conversely, once protected, investors are more likely to price an offering higher.
Issuers will then select a level of investor protection-whether provided through
private contract or through a regulatory regime-where the benefit from receiving a
higher offering price outweighs the added costs of such protection. Competition in
theory, therefore, may lead to the joint maximization of the wealth of issuers and
investors.
What we have today, however, is not solely regulatory competition over
investor protection. Certainly, investors and issuers have much greater choice in
the regulatory regime that governs their transactions than in the past. Greater
integration between world financial centers is largely responsible for this greater
level of choice. Several decades ago, most investors stayed within their domestic
capital markets. Today, it is possible for U.S. investors to purchase securities
(often through a mutual fund intermediary) of German companies from French
investors in a transaction that occurs, for example, on the London Stock
Exchange (LSE). 3 And with the choice of a particular financial market often
comes a set of regulatory protective measures originating from the home country
of the selected financial market. An investor that invests in companies trading on
the LSE receives the benefits of the LSE's listing requirements (among other
protection). 4 Of course, the present choice in regimes often does result in
substantive changes in the level of investor protection. In the United States, for
example, the threat that issuers and investors would otherwise go to offshore
markets led to the promulgation of Rule 144A, among other provisions, on the
part of the SEC. 5
One drawback of the current level of regulatory competition is that it is not entirely
clear what other countries may also have the ability to regulate a transnational
transaction. Theoretically, four possible jurisdictions may take an interest in any one
securities transaction. Consider the example above. The U.S. may care about its
own investors (purchasing the securities); France may care about its investors
13. This is not to say the choice is unfettered. Investors and issuers may very well have a bias to stay
within their home country. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money:
Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855, 1876 (1997) (noting that "[aIll other things
being equal, [] firms may desire to raise capital domestically due to several natural advantages of their home
country").
But even with a home field advantage, competition will occur as regulators attempt to keep
those investors and issuers at the margin between staying at home and going to a foreign
securities market. Moreover, the more ill-suited the level of investor protection, the more likely
investors and issuers will exit despite the home field advantage.
Id.
14. For a discussion of the impact from listing on the LSE, see HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL
WOLFF, 3F SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 28.9 (2d ed. 2002).
15. See Josh Futterman, Note, Evasion and Flowback in the Regulation S Era: Strengthening U.S.
Investor Protection While Promoting U.S. Corporate Offshore Offerings, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 806, 840-41
(1995); Samuel Wolff, Offshore Distributions Under the Securities Act of 1933: An Analysis of Regulation S, 23
LAW& POL'YINT'LBUS. 101, 112-16 (1991-1992).
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(selling the securities); Germany may care about its own companies and the
perception of the world generally about the credibility of German companies; and
finally, Great Britain may care about the reputation of the LSE. Without a clear
demarcation of regulatory authority, investors and issuers face uncertainty as to
what regulations will apply to their transactions.
Given the uncertainty in the boundaries of regulatory authority, competition
may spur a competitive response of a more detrimental kind among regulators. In
particular, regulators from different countries faced with the possibility that
issuers and investors may exit for the regimes of other jurisdictions may act
affirmatively to block such an exit. Home country regulators generally enjoy the
power to force domestically-located corporations and investors to remain under
the home country regime regardless of the location of the transaction. In the
United States, regulators have not in fact made this choice, allowing issuers
pursuant to Regulation S the ability to partially escape the U.S. securities laws.1
6
Nevertheless, the option remains available to regulators. Countries may place
barriers on investors seeking to invest capital outside the country. Up until the
mid-1990s, for example, Korea placed barriers on the ability of Korean investors
to invest funds overseas. 7 Countries may also impose restrictions on the ability
of a domestic company to follow the corporate laws of another country. Under
the Korean Commercial Code, for example, a firm incorporated in a foreign
jurisdiction is subject to all the provisions of the Code if it has its head office or
main operation in Korea.' 8
Regulators may also seek to expand their authority aggressively. The United
States, for example, presently fragments regulatory responsibility for various
financial products among different agencies. The SEC has primary responsibility for
the regulation of "securities."' 9 The Commodities and Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) regulates "commodities" and "futures."' For the past several decades, the
CFTC and SEC have engaged in costly "turf" battles over jurisdictional authority.2'
16. See 17 C.F.R. 230.901-05 (Regulation S). The exit option available under Regulation S is only partial.
Issuers making an offshore offering may continue to face possible U.S. antifraud laws. As well, to the extent the issuer
has a substantial number of securities trading in the United States (or is listed on a U.S. exchange), the issuer must
comply with periodic disclosure requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
17. See In-Kie Hong, Securities Laws in Korea and Regulations on Foreign Investment, 10 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 157, 192-93 (1996).
18. See Korean Commercial Code, art. 617.
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1994) (providing a definition of "security" for the Securities Act of 1933);
see also id. § 78c(a)( 10) (providing a definition of "security" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
20. A futures contract is a standardized agreement involving a buyer and a seller. The buyer agrees to
purchase a fixed quantity of a commodity at a specified date from the seller at a fixed price.
21. SEC officials during the 1970s feared that the term "commodity" encompassed even ordinary
securities. Former SEC Chairman Roderick Hills noted in 1975 that "it is relatively easy to suggest that the
most basic examples of what is unambiguously a security, such as a share of GM or AT&T, are literally within
the definition of a 'commodity'...." Letter from SEC Chairman Roderick M. Hills to CFTC Chairman William
T. Bagley, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) P20, 117 (Nov. 13, 1975). The SEC's
battle with the CFTC culminated in the Shad-Johnson Accord of 1982. For an account of the SEC-CFTC
conflict leading up to the Shad-Johnson Accord and the inadequacies of the Accord, see William J. Brodsky,
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While interesting from the perspective of public choice theorists, the turf battle
between the SEC and the CFTC has generated large lobbying costs and distraction
costs among regulators. Investors, moreover, have been left with a large degree of
uncertainty and often have been simply locked out of certain types of financial
products (including, up to recently, futures in single stocks).22 As financial
markets continue to integrate and transactions increasingly involve multiple
jurisdictions, absent an international agreement, pressures will build on regulators to
• 23
extend their jurisdiction extraterritorially to cover such transactions.
Alternatively, regulators in one country may work to harmonize the level of
investor protection across several countries to reduce the effective choice available to
issuers and investors (and thereby the incentives of market participants to choose a
different regime). The SEC, for example, for years attempted to obtain the passage
of U.S. style insider trading laws in a number of countries.2 Such efforts toward
harmonization, however, are both costly and questionable in effectiveness. While
many countries have adopted formal insider trading prohibitions, for example,
only a relative few have ever enforced these prohibitions.
In sum, where competition does exist, opportunistic regulators may compete
not with better investor protection but rather with aggressive grabs of authority.
Such grabs introduce both uncertainty costs for investors and may result in
unwarranted levels of harmonization in securities laws. Moving back to a system
of isolated islands of financial activity and regulatory authority, moreover, is
simply not an option in today's global marketplace. Those opposed to increased
levels of regulatory competition over investor protection must therefore consider
that the alternative is not a clean, monopolistic regulatory world but rather the
present multi-dimensional competitive regime.
New Legislation Permitting Stock Futures: The Long and Winding Road, 21 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 573, 574-
77(2001).
22. The Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 lifted the prohibition against futures in single
stocks within the United States. See Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554,
§ l(a)(5), 114 Stat. 2763 (2000). For a description of the Act, see Brodsky, supra note 21, at 577-87.
23. Groups of countries have already entered into international agreements allowing for a degree of
choice in the securities regulatory regime. See Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan, REGULATORY COMPETITION IN
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE IN 1999-PART I, 56 BUS. LAW. 653, 661-65
(2001) (describing the system of regulatory competition provided for in the European Union).
24. See Harvey L. Pitt & David B. Hardison, Games Without Frontiers: Trends in the International Response
to Insider Trading, 1992 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 204-06 (reporting how Switzerland and Japan both adopted
insider trading prohibitions under pressure from the United States). For a discussion of insider trading laws around the
world, see Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization ofInsider Trading Prohibitions, 15 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 63 (2002).
25. At the end of 1998, 103 countries with stock exchanges prohibited insider trading, but enforcement
had taken place at least once in only 38 countries. See Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of
Insider Trading, J. FIN. (forthcoming 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=200914 (last visited Jan. 17, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (noting that prior to
1990, only nine of 34 countries with prohibitions on insider trading ever engaged in an enforcement action).
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III. BEHAVIORAL BIASES
Even well intentioned regulators may face decision-making problems.26
Regulators, typically, are experts in their field of regulation. Commentators have
identified a great number of behavioral biases under which all people labor.
Expertise may help alleviate some of these biases.27 Certainly, many SEC staffers
can claim a large degree of expertise in the functioning of the financial markets
(as well as the various guises of fraud). However, with expertise often comes
several behavioral illusions. Rather than catalog such biases systematically, this
essay mentions a few biases particularly relevant to analyzing how regulators
may make decisions.28
Commentators, for example, have noted that expert regulators may suffer
from an overconfidence bias, believing too greatly in their ability to solve
difficult regulatory problems.29 Regulators may also make decisions with a tunnel
vision-like view of a problem, applying a particular decision-making framework
to all new problems uncritically despite the possibility that the framework may
not apply. Regulators may also make decisions with bounded rationality. Not
only is the information in the hands of regulators imperfect, but regulators may
misinterpret the information in a systematic manner. For example, people often
suffer from an availability bias, placing too great of a weight on more recent and
immediate information.30
The availability bias, perhaps combined with overconfidence and tunnel
vision, may then lead regulators and lawmakers into an overreaction when faced
with a financial scandal.3' Once in place, moreover, even regulations that are the
product of an overreaction on the part of the SEC and lawmakers may take years
to undo.32
26. For an analysis of the behavioral problems facing SEC regulators, see Stephen J. Choi & A.C.
Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC (Working Paper, 2002).
27. For a discussion of the benefit of expertise for certain behavioral biases, see Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive
Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 499-502 (2002);
see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 549, 558-61 (2002).
28. For a discussion of the behavioral biases plaguing regulatory experts, see Seidenfeld, supra note 27,
at 496-99.
29. See Seidenfeld, supra note 27, at 498-99. SEC regulators are particularly slow in revising their prior
held positions, a symptom of perhaps overconfidence in their positions (among other things).
30. See id. at 501-02.
31. For a more detailed discussion of the impact of behavioral biases on SEC regulators, see Stephen J.
Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC (Working Paper, 2003) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer).
32. See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.
Q. 849, 850 (1997) (contending that over the past 300 years the major pieces of securities related regulation
came about following a large and sustained price collapse in the stock market).
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As with public choice problems, competition may have ameliorative effects
on behavioral biases among regulators. Regulators facing competition for
investors and issuers from other jurisdictions have less leeway to make behavioral
mistakes. Regulators and lawmakers may then have a greater incentive to structure
their organizations to minimize the size of behavioral problems. Commentators have
suggested, for example, bringing in decision-makers from different disciplines as
well as employing review of agency decisions as a means of reducing behavioral
biases.33
The present multidimensional degree of regulatory competition, nevertheless,
may also amplify behavioral biases among regulators. Regulators faced with
competition may-out of overconfidence or a cognitive dissonance need to
justify their authority-determine that alternative regulators simply cannot
protect investors as well as they can. Regulators suffering from behavioral biases
may then act to obtain regulatory authority solely for themselves. So long as
regulators may react to competition along dimensions other than simply catering to the
interests of issuers and investors, securities market participants are vulnerable to costly
actions on the part of regulators under the cloud of behavioral biases.
IV. CONCLUSION
Global capital markets are becoming more integrated. With the free flow of
capital has come increased competition between different financial centers. Part
of the competition centers around the level of investor protection provided
through different regimes. Studies have shown that foreign companies, in fact,
may choose the U.S. capital markets, for example, because of the higher level of
investor protection provided inside the United States.
4
For those in favor of increased regulatory competition, the growing integration of
world financial markets is generally viewed as a positive occurrence. Nevertheless, this
essay casts some doubt as to the value of regulatory competition along dimensions
other than the supply of investor protection. Certainly, regulators may respond to the
threat of foreign market competition through increased attention to providing the
level of investor protection that maximizes the joint welfare of issuers and
investors. Nevertheless, the very public choice and behavioral bias problems that
competition may help alleviate also may result in regulators taking actions to
seize regulatory authority from one another.35 Regulators may compete not over the
types and quality of investor protection but rather over jurisdictional boundaries and the
33. See Seidenfeld, supra note 27, at 526-47.
34. See William A. Reese, Jr. & Michael S. Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-
listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings (Working Paper, 2000), http.//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfin?abstractid= 194670 (last visited Feb. 12, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer); see also
Craig Doidge et al., Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?, (NBER, Working Paper No. 8538,2001),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstractid=286963 (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer); Coffee,
supra note 7 (summarizing the empirical evidence on cross-listings into the United States).
35. For a discussion of the public choice barriers to competition, see Tung, supra note 9.
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extraterritorial application of law. Much as the turf battle between the SEC and the
CFTC, clashing regulators on a world stage promises to result in increased costs and
uncertainty for investors, reducing overall welfare.
Those who believe in regulatory competition must contend with the practical
problem of exactly how to achieve greater levels of competition without
incurring a backlash from regulators seeking to protect their regulatory turf. This,
of course, does not mean that regulatory competition lacks merit. Indeed, those
that take the view that regulatory competition will lead to a race to the bottom
must contend with the reality that a degree of competition is already with us.
Moreover, the present competition is more problematic compared to a regime
under which competition occurs solely over investor protection given the possibility
of turf battles and uncertainty. Investor welfare may be improved if we moved
more toward a fully competitive system under which regulators could only compete
along one dimension-the provision of investor protection.
The level of regulatory competition of course is not a given. While greater
financial integration does lead to more competition, Frederick Tung has made the
related observation that regulators will oppose any adoption of choice of law
rules that allow the application of a foreign jurisdiction's securities law within a
particular home country.36 Whether in fact we will eventually move to a fully
competitive system where regulators compete solely on the basis of supplied
investor protection to attract issuers or investors, therefore, remains an open
issue.37 Reason exists, however, to be optimistic. The European Union, for
example, already employs a regulatory structure that permits a degree of
regulatory regime choice for issuers while curtailing the ability of individual
country regulators to compete along other possible dimensions.38
36. See id.
37. Of course, a country may nevertheless benefit through a unilateral move toward choice even if the
rest of the world does not follow suit. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Promoting Issuer Choice in Securities
Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT'L LAW 815, 847 n. 115 (2001). The public choice problem, nevertheless, applies even
in one country.
38. See Jackson & Pan, supra note 23, at 661-65 ("The mutual recognition provision creates a 'passport'
under which an issuer from a different member state can choose to access the capital market of a host member
state on the basis of having met the requirements of its home and not the requirements of the host.").
Jackson and Pan, nevertheless, present evidence that despite the choice available within the European
Union, many issuers are simply avoiding the choice altogether, opting to use privately-determined levels of
disclosure (mirroring U.S. style disclosures) in private placement style offerings. See id. at 654-55. Even where
issuers are not actively selecting from among different regime options presented in the EU, the EU's
competitive infrastructure, by allowing issuers to construct their own levels of disclosure in private placements
free of interference from aggressive regulators that might otherwise wish to regulate such transactions within
their home jurisdictions, allows private competition to center around the provision of value-increasing investor
protection. See id. at 681-82 ("In compliance with the [EU's Public Offers Directive (POD)], the securities laws
of member states must include a professionals exemption, which is analogous to the U.S. private placement
exemption."). "Under this legal structure, as long as a European issuer plans its offering to include only
institutional investors that qualify for the professionals exemption implemented under local laws, the issuer
does not need to worry about local rules governing distribution of disclosure materials to local retail
investors .. " Id.
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Proponents of the race to the bottom school could offer an alternative response to
the problem of multi-dimensional competition: global harmonization of securities
regulations. Nonetheless, the costs for a move toward investor protection-based
competition are undoubtedly lower than the costs of implementing global
harmonization. A move toward investor-protection competition requires a one
time enactment of choice of law rules forcing rivalry along the dimension of
supplied investor protection (much as in the European Union). Global harmonization
efforts, on the other hand, require an ongoing effort at determining the "right"
level of regulations and obtaining repeated consensus among a number of
different jurisdictions on every single new substantive regulatory provision (as
well as assurances that enforcement in fact is taking place).39 Competition,
moreover, may potentially provide more benefits as regulators are spurred to
provide value-increasing investor protection (in a way that regulators in a
harmonized regulatory system may not necessarily face the same competitive
incentive to do so).4°
39. Issuer choice, on the other hand, requires no ongoing consensus building among countries. Of
course, individual countries may later attempt to modify an international agreement to allow an issuer choice
regime once established. Nevertheless, issuer choice becomes relatively difficult to undo over time as investors
and issuers come to rely on the availability of choice, forming a natural constituency in favor of issuer choice.
40. For a discussion of the perils of moving toward one world securities regulator, see Stephen J. Choi,
Assessing Regulatory Responses to Securities Market Globalization, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 613, 643-45
(2001).
